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1Abstract
During the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2002 the new party ʻList of Pim Fortuyn  ʼhas 
won 26 seats at the cost of the established parties, most notably the PvdA and the VVD which 
both hoped to win the elections. After the election, they had fallen to a shared third position. 
Why could one outsider without a well-developed party organisation arrive at such a smashing 
electoral victory? We argue that personality, media attention, party campaigns and candidate 
behaviour are not the main answers. Who wants to understand Fortuynʼs victory must study his 
victims. We show that the programmatic convergence of the established parties has made them 
look indistinguishable in the eyes of many voters. This perceived lack of a democratic choice 
has strengthened the feeling of many voters that the established parties have become part of the 
state and have lost their capacity to sense the problems of ordinary citizens, let alone to solve 
them. Fortuyn effectively used this discontent by means of right-wing populism. Although 
Fortuyn was pictured as a right-wing extremist, we show that this is not the case when his 
manifestos are compared with other European parties. 
This paper was first presented at the Flemish-Dutch Politicologenetmaal, May 2002. We wish 
to thank all participants, in particular Kris Deschouwer, Paul Lucardie and André Krouwel, for 
their useful comments.
1. Introduction
The latest elections of 15 May 2002 belong to the most exciting and debated elections which 
ever took place in the Netherlands. The main reason is that a new party (List Pim Fortuyn) has 
been able to challenge the established parties successfully. Fortuyn was a rightist (but, as we 
will show, not extreme-right) populist who managed to mobilise the public opinion against the 
ʻpurple cabinet  ʼof the Labour Party (PvdA), the conservative liberals (VVD: the main rightist 
party) and the much smaller progressive liberals (D66). These parties governed in two cabinets: 
Purple I (1994-1998) and Purple II (1998-2002). The cabinets included D66 in order to be better 
able to bridge the gap between the left and right. It is named “purple” because it combines the 
“red” of the PvdA and the “blue” of the VVD. It was introduced in 1994 as a fresh new wind 
in Dutch politics, which was said to replace the old-fashioned centre politics of the Christian 
Democrats. The electoral defeat of the Christian democrats enabled a coalition between the 
main left and right parties. This meant a fundamental change of the relation between the VVD 
and PvdA. Whereas these parties did not accept each other as ʻcoalition partners  ʼin the 1940s 
and 1950s, they now embrace each other. PvdA, VVD and D66 felt relieved, because finally 
they were able to govern without the CDA which had been dominating all Dutch cabinets 
until 1994 (Dittrich 1987). But the public support for this new political cooperation has been 
falling quickly and rather unexpectedly since Wim Kok announced his retreat as party leader 
in September 2001.
 Fortuyn has been the catalyst of the latent and massive discontent with purple cabinets 
that are (said to be) not able to deliver physical, social, economical and medical security. He has 
been able to convince large groups that this cabinet has failed on all main policy areas which is 
expressed by the title of his latest book (which is also his election manifesto): “The ruins of the 
purple cabinets” (Fortuyn 2002a). In 1994 the Netherlands experienced an earthquake election 
in which the ʻnatural  ʼgoverning party, the Christian democratic CDA, lost 20 seats. In 2002 
a completely new party wins 26 seats, which is unprecedented in the Dutch political history. 
What this means is that the ʻcartel party modelʼ, in which colluding parties become agents of 
the state and employ the resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival, has been 
seriously challenged by an entrepreneurial party which is based on the initiatives of an outsider 
(Katz and Mair 1995).
 How can we account for this transformation of the party system into an open battlefield 
in which winners and losers come and go and in which established positions are becoming 
non-existent anymore? Why do right-extremism, right-wing populism and regionalism bring 
previously “frozen” party systems into flux? The answer to this question is pressing, since 
the electoral success of right-wing newcomers is not a purely Dutch phenomenon. The rise of 
rightist-populist and extreme right parties and candidates is taking place in several established 
European democracies, especially (but not exclusively) those with a strong Christian 
democratic tradition: Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy, Denmark. We will argue 
that the main cause is not the personality of Fortuyn and not the (mis-) achievements of the 
purple cabinets. Instead, the success of Fortuyn is strongly based on the convergence between 
the main parties since 1977. In order to demonstrate this, we will present a longitudinal and 
comparative analysis of the policy positions on the main conflict dimensions on the basis of 
election manifesto data.
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2. The reshaping of the Dutch party system
Dutch politics has long been dominated by confessional parties from Catholic and Protestant 
origin. Until 1994, they have not only been present in all cabinets, but they have also been 
dominating these cabinets as so-called ʻstrong parties  ʼsince the KVP/CDA has been able to 
veto the cabinet composition (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Especially the Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA), the merger of the three main confessional parties, has been very successful 
in this role. This was partly due to the way Ruud Lubbers operated as a Prime Minister in the 
period November 1982 to May 1994. He was able to attract the electoral support of many voters 
(not merely Christians) by propagating a business-like approach to policy-making, which was 
needed in order to tackle the problems resulting from the crisis of the welfare state. But with 
his withdrawal from politics his party fell into a deep gap and his successor Elco Brinkman 
was not able to equal his popularity. A similar situation occured in 2002 when Ad Melkert, the 
successor of Prime Minister Wim Kok (PvdA), has not been able to equal the popularity of his 
predecessor (even his own party had to admit this during the election campaign)1.  He resigned 
directly after the election results became public. Other established parties are in electoral 
problems too. D66 has always been fluctuating strongly among elections and during 2002 they 
lost nearly half the vote share of 1998. 
 The shaky position of established parties opens the gate for newcomers. The most 
challenging ones are List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland 
(LN)). The latter originated from a group of local parties, which successfully challenged the 
dominant position of national parties at the local level2.  They are populist in arguing that local 
politics needs local parties in order to be able to know what the people need on a daily basis. 
In October 2001 Liveable Netherlands (LN) gathered three seats in the NIPO-opinion poll3. 
Immediately after this party announced on 23 October that Pim Fortuyn was the most preferred 
first candidate on the party list (ʻlijsttrekkerʼ) the number of predicted seats rose to seven in 
November 2001 (Figure 1). 
 Fortuyn has been professor in the social sciences, was proudly homosexual and has 
become well known and popular for his sharp opinions which he presents in his books and 
newspaper articles, debates and presentations (Fortuyn 2001a; 2001b, 2002a; 2002b). He spoke 
out against immigration and high taxation, accused the Dutch government of poor performance, 
described the Islam as a “backward culture” (Fortuyn 2001a), argued that the Netherlands 
was full up with 16 million people, cautioned about the expansion of the European Union. He 
stressed that he was not against immigrants, but he questioned their ability to assimilate into a 
liberal and racially tolerant culture and argued that immigration had to be curbed in order for 
the Netherlands  ʼ liberal social values to survive. This message was not understood by most 
of the international press, which consequently described him as a right-wing extremist and 
racist.
 Fortuyn clearly was a maverick politician who courted controversies with his robust 
style (blunt, outspoken, and flamboyant) which has been unprecedented in Dutch politics. 
Fortuynʼs outspoken opinions nearly caused him to fail as a challenging political entrepreneur. 
In the weekend of 10-11 February 2002 he was forced to leave Liveable Netherlands after he 
advocated the abolishment of article 1 of the Dutch Constitution (guaranteeing freedom and 
shelter from discrimination). This far reaching opinion originated from Fortuynʼs bad feelings 
against the Moslems in the Netherlands: he wants to be able to discriminate them if they do 
not fully comply with the Dutch way of living (such as speaking the language and adhering to 
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the Dutch culture, including its tolerance!). After leaving Livable Netherlands he founded the 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). This immediately led to a drop of the seats of LN in the opinion polls 
(Figure 1). 
 The LPF was extremely successful during the local elections on 6 March (week 10) in 
Rotterdam where Fortuyn lives. His party became the largest party in Rotterdam with 35% of 
the votes, which is a remarkable achievement since this city has been dominated by the social 
democrats (PvdA) during the whole of the post-war period. Fortuyn made it clear that it is his 
goal is to repeat this electoral success on the national level by becoming the largest party (and 
hence Prime Minister) after May 15. This announcement was first met with scepticism, but 
after his local victory the national political establishment (above all the PvdA and VVD) was 
literally stunned and not able to react promptly to this major challenge.
Since this event he was taken seriously by the media who weekly reported the opinion polls 
as summarised in Figure 1. This Figure shows the predicted number of seats, starting from 
October 2001 and from week 7 in 2002 on a weekly basis until 2 days before the elections 
(week 20). The figure demonstrates how strong the electoral appeal of Fortuyn was. The 
established national party leaders were not able to respond convincingly to his appearances 
and provoking remarks during talk shows. Prominent party members and elites reacted by 
urging their own ʻlijsttrekker  ʼto confront Fortuyn, but they were mostly not willing or able to 
so do in a very successful manner. The position of the lijsttrekkers of the VVD and the PvdA 
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was openly questioned by party members which is not a strong position vis-à-vis the populist 
Fortuyn. Only Paul Rosenmöller, heading the Green Left, was able to beat him once and equal 
Fortuyn once during an election debate (coinciding with the dip in Figure 1 after week 12). 
Two prominent former VVD-leaders even started to ʻhelp  ʼHans Dijkstal who was heading the 
VVD-list. EU-commissioner Bolkestein (VVD) expressed two weeks before the elections his 
contempt for Fortuyn by stating that if Fortuyn would become Prime Minister the Netherlands 
would completely lose its face (“reveal a preposterous figure”) in the international arena. 
Fortuyn, from his part, called Bolkestein a coward who left the country instead of helping to 
solve the main problems.
 Whereas Fortuyn and Livable Netherlands are unstable newcomers who just entered 
the electoral arena, the Christian Union (a fusion of two existing Orthodox Protestant parties) 
and the Socialist Party are two stable ʻnewcomers  ʼwith each around six to seven seats. The 
success of these new parties underlines the vulnerable position of established parties. This 
process is accompanied by several factors which all indicate that voters have changed: the rise 
of the floating vote and the fall of turnout and party membership. Voters are becoming less 
attached to party politics and delay their vote to the last moment (as far as they intend to vote 
at all). During the elections of 1989 only 8% of the voters changed from parties. In 1994 this 
percentage has doubled and in 1998 25% of the voters changed from parties (Thomassen et al. 
2000). Peter Mair (2002) has shown that in the 1990s the Netherlands has the second highest 
electoral volatility and mean total vote for new parties in Europe (after Italy). These are all 
indicators for an increased vulnerability of the political elites which further open the gates for 
new parties.
 Ten days before the elections something happened that shocked Europe in general 
and the Dutch electorate in particular. On 6 May the popular Pim Fortuyn was murdered after 
a radio talk outside the studios in Hilversum by a white male who is believed to be a Green 
activist. The day after, the government decided not the postpone the elections after having 
heart the strong wish of the LPF-party and family members and some of the established 
parties. They argued not to disrupt the democratic process because of a violent act. Wim Kok 
accepted this line of argumentation by stating that the Dutch democracy should be considered 
strong enough to overcome this tragic event. This decision was considered to be problematic 
by many commentators because the LPF mainly was Fortuyn. The other members on the list 
were hardly known by the public. Many expected that his death would make Fortuyn even 
more attractive to voters because of his appeal as a ʻMessiahʼ, freeing the population from the 
old political establishment by bringing new ideas and practices in, will become stronger and 
cannot be defied by anything he says or does, simply because he isnʼt around anymore. This 
opens the possibility that many votes will go to a person who cannot represent the ideas he has 
expressed towards the voters. 
 To what extent the candidates can fulfil Fortuynʼs promises is, of course, uncertain. The 
past Dutch experience indicates that new parties without strong leaders or a coherent ideology 
are not likely to survive in the long run (i.e. the Farmer Party, the Elderly Party, the (racist) 
Centre Party etc.). The first poll after his death (which was also the last one before the elections 
(in week 20)) shows that LPF was predicted to win extra 2 seats since Fortuynʼs death. This 
is at the cost of the PvdA whose first candidate Melkert was said by some commentators to be 
responsible for a climate in which the murder could take place, because of this ʻdemonising  ʼ
attacks on Fortuyn. Other commentators fiercely rejected this accusation, but the effect on the 
voters seems there. What remains then, two days before the elections is a stunning battlefield: 
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The two governing parties who had the strongest starting positions at the beginning of the 
campaign lost their top ranking positions in the polls and were replaced by an opposition party 
(the CDA) and by the newcomer LPF. The lijsttrekker of the CDA, Van Balkenende, is also a 
newcomer because he replaced the Jaap De Hoop Scheffer as CDA-ʻlijsttrekker  ʼin September 
2001. The latter had to leave after an internal crisis on the leadership of the party. The sudden 
drop of PvdA and VVD in favour of the CDA and LPF during the last two days before the 
elections was heavily reinforced on the election day itself. The Purple cabinet was smashed 
way. 
 What is of interest here is why one person is able to pose such a serious threat to the 
established political parties. Many commentators believe that this is mainly due to the capacity 
of Fortuyn to mobilise voters who have hitherto been unsatisfied with or not interested in 
politics. We argue that Fortuynʼs success was only possible because of long-term convergence 
of the established parties. The PvdA and VVD have been so eager to govern and to grow on 
the 20 seats that had been left behind by the CDA in 1994, that they neglected to sharpen their 
arguments against each other for the long period of eight years. Although the performance 
of the purple cabinet was considered to be not very bad (due to a booming economy), the 
governing parties lost their credibility in the eyes of many voters (Hoogerwerf 1999; Becker 
et al. 2001; Van Schie 1997). Large groups felt that the established parties were largely 
indistinguishable from each other, apart from their common feature that they were not able to 
solve social problems. Plans and promises stemming from these parties for the upcoming four 
years were met with scepticism by journalists and commentators because, so they said, these 
parties have had eight years of time to work on these problems. 
 In a comparative essay (ʻSurveyʼ) of The Economist, published on 3 May, it was shown 
that there is no reason to exaggerate these problems because they are relatively small (or even 
non-existent) compared with other countries. As far as these problems exist, they cannot explain 
the success of Fortuyn. We will show empirically how parties converged on the main conflict 
dimensions and with what effects on the basis of a content analysis of election manifestos. 
This analysis shows the importance of the programmatic profile of parties and how dangerous 
it is for parties to neglect their distinct position vis-à-vis each other. When voters have little 
to choose because programmatic differences are unclear or remain unspoken, they become 
susceptible to the challenges by newcomers. The Dutch electoral system is open enough to 
make these challenges realistic, especially since the electoral volatility is rising rapidly. 
3. The positioning of parties on salient policy dimensions
Although most voters are not reading election manifestos, they are still crucial for determining 
what parties stand for. These documents provide voters and commentators the main tool to 
distinguish between political parties on the main issues and conflict dimensions. In this sense, 
manifestos enable voters to make a choice, which influences the cabinet composition and future 
policies. Since voters do not compare these documents on all main issues themselves, they rely 
on simplified representations of these documents. It has been shown empirically that citizens 
with a moderate level of political knowledge are still able to position parties adequately on the 
basis of their knowledge of the ideological positions of parties (Van der Brug 1997). Ideology 
stands here for a summary state point on a multitude of specific issues (as listed in Table 2) and 
is used as a simple yardstick to infer the content of election manifestos. 
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Table 2. Overview of four types of issues forming the two main conflict dimensions in the Netherlands
Left issues Progressive issues Conservative issues Right issues 
Anti-imperialism Anti-growth economy Economical productivityMilitary: positive
Peace National Way of 
Life: negative
Individual Freedom
Internationalism: positive Constitutionalism: positive
National Way of 
Life: positive
Multi-culturalism: 
positive
Multi-culturalism: 
negative
Democracy Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency
Traditional morality: 
negative
Traditional morality: 
positive
Market regulation Free enterprise
Economic planning Environmental protectionIncentives to induce 
enterprise 
Protectionism: positive Protectionism: negative
Controlled economy Economic orthodoxy 
(thrift and saving; 
strong currency)
Nationalisation Welfare State Limitation
Welfare state: expansion Law and Order
Education expansion Social Harmony
Labour groups: positive
Source: Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge et al. 2001
The left-right scale is computed as: Left issues minus Right issues.
The progressive-conservative scale is computed as: Progressive minus Conservative issues.
The maximum value of the scale is 100 (all emphasis is on left or progressive issues) . The minimum value is 
–100 (all emphasis is on right or conservative issues).
According to Downs, all issue positions of parties can be reduced to a single ideological 
liberal-conservative dimension (Downs 1957). We will assume, however, a more-dimensional 
policy space. The Left-Right continuum and the Progressive-Conservative divide are known 
to be the most salient conflict dimensions in the Dutch context (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989; 
Middendorp 1991; Laver 1995). The former is clearly related to socio-economic differences on 
income, work, social insurance, economic growth and the intervening role of the government. 
The latter is related to norms and values and the individual freedom to act (or not to act) in 
social and cultural terms. Although these notions are still contested, it is common knowledge 
that they are important in the shaping of the preferences of voters (Klingeman et al. 1994; 
Pennings and Keman 1993; Van Wijnen 2001). 
 The large majority of voters is able to position parties on both dimensions rather 
consistently. In a similarly fashion we will position parties on two salient dimensions on the 
basis of the coded party manifestos. We employ a revised version of the left-right scale, which 
was introduced by Klingemann et al. on the basis of a factor analysis (Klingemann et al. 1994). 
We have adapted this scale slightly by removing and overlapping items. The full description 
of these variables is published in Budge et al (2001). The progressiveness-conservatism scale 
is based on a selection of issues that are dominant in the Dutch debate on norms and values. 
These issues also figured prominently during the election campaign in 2002.
 Most election programs of established parties in Western democracies have been coded 
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with a coding scheme of 56 issues. This has the disadvantage of a lack of flexibility (once 
the documents have been coded, they cannot be changed anymore), but also the advantage 
of comparability, i.e. the ability to compare parties from different countries and time periods 
with each other (see for an overview of the limits and possibilities: Laver 2001; Pennings 
and Keman 2002). This coding scheme has been applied to the Dutch draft manifestos that 
normally do not differ a lot from their final versions4.  
 Many political scientists have demonstrated that the positions that parties take on 
the Left-Right dimension influence both the individual voting behaviour and the chance of 
parties to participate in government (Laver 1995; Van der Brug 1997). This also goes for the 
divide between progressive and conservative although it is generally less recognisable and 
salient. This dimension remains important in the Netherlands because it is linked to opinions 
on religious norms and values which large groups (have been) attached or which figured 
prominently during the period they grew up as a child. The combination of both dimensions 
reveals the political-ideological battlefield or policy space, which is decisive for the competition 
and future cooperation between parties (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1999). In order to avoid any 
misunderstanding of the parties, we present a small overview of the competing parties and their 
electoral fortunes.
Table 3: Recent electoral fortunes of parties and party families in the Netherlands (Seats 
in Parliament)
Party Party Family 1989 1994 1998 2002 98-02
+/-
Socialist Party (SP) Socialist - 2 5 9 +4
Green Left (GRL) New Left/ecologists 6 5 11 11 0
PvdA Social-Democrats 49 37 45 23 -22
D66 Left Liberals 12 24 14 7 -7
Liveable Netherlands 
(LN)
Regional Populist - - - 2 +2
CDA Christian-Democrats 54 34 29 43 +14
VVD Conservative 
Liberals
22 31 38 23 -15
List Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF)
Right-wing populist - - - 26 +26
SGP, GPV, RPF
(CU=RPF+GPV)
Orthodox Christians 6 7 8 6 -2
CD, CP86 Extreme (near racist) 
right
1 3 0 - -
Others 0 7 0 0 -
Source: Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001; Teletekst
Table 3 reveals the strong fluctuations in electoral support for the main parties. Whereas 
established parties profited from each otherʼs losses in 1994 and 1998, in 2002 it is a newcomer 
that attracts many voters (also from voters that would not have voted otherwise). Table 3 
indicates that Dutch politics is in flux. But why and how? In order to understand these drastic 
electoral changes, one has to look at developments trough time. They are best expressed by the 
left-right movements of the Dutch parties in Figure 2.
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In case of the newcomers we see, of course, no movement but a single position in 2002. Figure 
2 shows that there has been a considerable convergence between 1977 and 2002. We will 
specify the trends per party or groups of parties:
- The PvdA has moved from a pronounced left position (in 1977) towards a left-centre 
position. As a result, the PvdA has lost voters that could not recognise themselves 
anymore in this new position, but at the same time it has improved its prospects to govern 
(Hillebrand and Irwin 1999). This strategic choice can be explained from several factors 
that pushed the PvdA towards a more moderate policy stance, such as the weakening 
of labour unions, the rise of neo-liberalism, the budgetary discipline that is imposed by 
the EMU-Treaty etc. It is also related to a well-known dilemma regarding the electoral 
trade-off of social democratic strategy. In the presence of left-libertarian competitors like 
the Green Left and D66 and (to a lesser degree) the SP, the social democrats can chose 
to maximise votes (by moving to the left) but fail to win the median voter and therefore 
have only limited bargaining power over government formation. The alternative option 
is to maximise their bargaining power by controlling the median voter but sacrifice votes 
to their left-libertarian competitors (Kitschelt 1999: 328). Kitschelt has argued that the 
moderate strategy is most attractive and least costly in the face of a weak left-libertarian 
competition and little centrist competition. In the Dutch case it is clear that the combined 
votes of left-libertarian parties is relatively large and that the centrist competition is 
very strong. This makes the choice of the PvdA to opt for a cabinet with the VVD extra 
risky because of the difficulties to maintain their core support (Aarts, Macdonald and 
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Rabinowitz 1999; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1999).
- D66 has also moved from a radical left to a near centre position. The ambition of D66 
was to replace the CDA as a pivotal party in Dutch politics. And it has succeeded in doing 
so during the Purple cabinets, but it is unlikely to continue to do so in the near future 
because a new Purple cabinet is highly unlikely, given the recent massive sentiments 
against its policies.
- More recently, the Green Left is growing towards a middle position because it explicitly 
has the ambition to govern in a CDA-PvdA-Green Left cabinet. The Green Left has a 
record of good prospects in opinion polls, but disappointing results during elections. In 
2002 this pattern was repeated. For this reason an office-seeking strategy could result 
in higher payoffs than a vote-seeking position. Besides, the Socialist Party (SP) is to 
the left of the Green Left so that this position (needed to attract more voters) is already 
occupied.
- The CDA takes a rather stable position in the middle and rather pragmatically moves 
to the left and right in a cyclical manner, following the general trend of the other parties. 
This is what one would expect from a party that has strong office-seeking motives. It is 
remarkable that the orthodox Protestant Christian Union (CU) is economically to the left 
of the CDA which was recognised by the other parties (in particular by the Green Left).
- The VVD takes a relatively stable position with occasional moves to the (far) right, as 
in 1982 and 2002. It moves further to the right in 2002. This is understandable since the 
VVD has no ambition to govern with the PvdA in the new cabinet (as announced by Hans 
Dijkstal during the election campaign). 
- The List Pim Fortuyn is slightly to the left of the VVD and hence Fortuyn did not try 
to reach voters to the far right of the VVD. One reason is that Fortuyn was mainly office 
seeking: he liked to picture himself as the new Prime Minister. He favoured a coalition 
with the CDA and the VVD. In order to cooperate with the CDA, he could not move too 
far to the right. Livable Netherlands takes position between LPF and the CDA, which 
gives it a more moderate profile than the List Pim Fortuyn does.
In general we can draw two conclusions. In the short run, we see a sharp contrast between 1998 
when most parties moved to the left, whereas in 2002 most parties moved to the right. 1998 
was obviously an election year in a period of economic prosperity in which parties could easily 
promise to spend more on social goals than in 2002 when the economic prospects are far less 
optimistic. 
 In the long run, the Dutch party system is becoming more and more scattered. Until 
1989 several parties merged and brought about the joint parties of the CDA and the Green Left. 
In 1989 there were only five main alternatives. In 2002, however, there are eight alternatives 
that have divided the available policy space around the centre into small subsections, so that 
the policy space between parties has become smaller. This convergence between parties and the 
scattering of the party system have intensified the party competition. It has also been conducive 
to a higher electoral volatility, because the distances between parties are becoming so small that 
it becomes easier for voters to switch between parties. Hence, the growing number of floating 
voters is induced by programmatic convergence since the 1970s. The changes have transformed 
the main parties in the centre (CDA, PvdA, D66) into catchall parties which all seek the median 
voter position on the two most salient issue dimensions. During the government formation 
in 1994 and 1998 we have indeed seen that these three parties managed to take the median 
party position on either the left-right or the progressive-conservative dimension, whereas 
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these positions were for a long time claimed by only one party: The CDA (Kleinnijenhuis and 
Pennings 2001). In 2002 the CDA has regained its median position on the left-right and on the 
progressive-conservative dimension which puts it in a strong bargaining position. However, 
this position is also weakened by the fact that the long-term payoffs of the feasible alternatives 
to choose from (a right-wing CDA-VVD-LPF cabinet versus a centre-left CDA-PvdA-GRL) 
are uncertain. In case of the CDA-VVD-LPF combination the CDA has to cooperate with a 
right-wing majority within the cabinet (LPF + VVD) which is less comfortable than a strong 
position in the middle which it occupied in most cabinets before 1994.
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Figure 3 shows the movements on the Progressiveness-Conservatism scale. On this conflict 
dimension the convergence does not dominate. Since 1977 the party positions have become 
more diverse. During the 1980s there is a trend towards more progressiveness. In the 1990s, 
however, several parties move towards a more conservative policy stance. The only exception 
is the Green Left which moved in the contrary direction. But in 2002 it moves to a more 
conservative position that is still the most progressive one (identical to the Socialist Party). 
The conservative position of LPF (even more conservative than the CU) is remarkable 
given the emphasis that Fortuyn puts on liberal values regarding homosexuality, drugs use 
and euthanasia. However, these values were stressed during the campaign partly in order 
to compensate for the extreme right image and also to protect the Dutch culture from the 
supposedly anti-liberal Islamic influence. Hence, Fortuyn defines the Dutch national values 
different than the confessional parties do, but also not fully opposite to them as he adheres to 
confessional values too (Fortuyn 2000b)
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Figure 4 positions all parties on a two-dimensional map of the left-right dimension and the 
progressive-conservative dimension in 2002. The plot shows that three parties are left and 
progressive: the SP, the Green Left and D66. The reverse, conservative and right, is applicable 
to the list of Fortuyn (LPF) and the VVD. In the centre we find four parties of which two are 
confessional (CU and CDA), the PvdA is social democratic and LN is a populist-regionalist 
newcomer. The CU positions itself in left-right terms similarly as D66 and the PvdA, whereas 
the CDA takes the most central position on this dimension. This is the most favourite position 
of this party because it ideally enables the party to bridge the gap between left (PvdA) and right 
(VVD). D66 has successfully challenged this middle position in 1994 and (be it to a lesser 
extent) in 1998, but has now chosen a position more to the left because it knows that it will 
fail to maintain its position in 2002. Moving to the left will give this party some of its original 
radical identity back. The plot clearly shows the attack of Fortuyn (LPF) and LN from two 
frontiers. Fortuyn attracts voters from the VVD and voters orientated to the right of the centre. 
LN intended to do so towards the PvdA and the centre-left orientated voters, but was far less 
successful than Fortuyn because the latter is far more pronounced and effective in criticising 
the established parties on their achievements. After his break with LN, Fortuyn saw the PvdA 
as his most important competitor and it is remarkable that his rise (at least in the opinion polls) 
did more electoral damage to the VVD than to the PvdA until the last few days before the 
elections, when the PvdA lost and the VVD won (see Figure 1).
 The rank order of the parties on the progressive-conservative scale is clearly different 
from the left-right scale. The LPF is the most conservative party, directly followed by the 
Christian Union. The VVD is more progressive than the CDA since the VVD favours strongly 
the individual freedom to express oneself culturally and sexually in a liberal fashion whereas 
the CDA does not. The CDA favours a restoration of norms and values in which individuals are 
restricted in their behaviour in the sense that they have to adapt their way of life to conservative 
family-values. The LPF is conservative in the sense that it defines the Dutch way of life as 
dominant in which immigrants have to adapt by speaking the language and by integrating in 
the neighbourhood. This conservative orientation is an important similarity and both parties do 
not exclude each other from government (Fortuyn even preferred a coalition with the CDA). 
Judged solely on the basis of this conflict dimension, a coalition of CDA-VVD-LPF would be 
most feasible. On the basis of the left-right divide this coalition would be conceivable too, but 
with more distance between the CDA on the one hand and the VVD/LPF on the other. Such 
a cabinet would clearly be balanced to the right, which could cause tensions within the CDA 
between a left and right faction (as has happened before during the 1980s).
4. International comparisons
Until now we have described the policy convergence in the Netherlands and its consequences 
for the Dutch party system. We have seen that there has been a move to the right during the 
recent elections and a successful rise of a rightwing populist party. Fortuyn wants to close the 
borders for new immigrants, but those already in the country can stay as long as they adapt 
to the Dutch culture. When a similar point of view was expressed in the 1980s by the right-
wing extremist Centre-Democrats it encountered no large public support and it was heavily 
opposed as an abject party that should be abolished (according to many commentators). In 
the 1990s Frits Bolkestein (VVD) presented similar ideas but adopted them within a normal 
democratic discourse by positioning the VVD on this issue between the Centre Democrats 
and the PvdA (Tilly and Fennema 1998). In 2002 Fortuyn builds further on this by stating 
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that anti-immigration is a precondition for the survival of Dutch culture and prosperity. From 
ʻabject  ʼin the 1980s, anti-immigrant positions have become acceptable and even sound. Even 
the CDA first candidate explicitly stated: “The multicultural society has failed”. According to 
him, immigrants have to integrate, accept the Dutch cultural norms and values and speak the 
Dutch language. 
 This raises the obvious question: Is the Netherlands, being internationally well known 
and respected for its tolerance towards minorities, not tolerant anymore? Is Fortuyn the Dutch 
Jörg Haider? This question is justified by the general rise of support for right-wing extremist 
or right-wing populist views in Western Europe. During the French Presidential elections in 
April 2002 the extreme-right Le Pen was able to defeat the socialist Jospin and entered the 
second round against Chirac. In Austria Jörg Haider was not only able to attract many votes 
with rightist and nationalist views, but also managed to form a coalition government which 
made the EU launch measures which were later on disposed of: Haider was more or less 
accepted. In Italy the rise of Berlusconi, the Alleanza Nationale and Lega Nord are examples 
of parties that gain massive electoral support by means of populist opinions which often stress 
the importance of national and regional values and interests which should be protected against 
higher authorities and lower cultures. In other countries similar trends are taking place. In 
Switzerland we have Blocher, in Belgium is the Vlaams Blok from Dewinter and in Denmark 
the successful rise of the Dansk Folkepartit headed by Pia Kjaersgaard. In short, right-wing 
extremist groups and populist statements are gaining electoral support in Western Europe. This 
makes these parties more acceptable to the public and their participation in government (as in 
Italy and Austria) is also becoming an option.
 But the main question is: are these parties comparable? The manifesto data are well 
suited to answer this question because they are coded with a coding scheme that enables cross-
sectional comparisons through time. Figure 5 compares the Dutch parties with a selection 
of parties in Western Europe. These are ʻconservative  ʼparties from the UK and Norway and 
conservative Christian democratic parties from Germany and Norway. It turns out that the 
ideas of Fortuyn and the VVD are compatible with the mainstream conservatism in Europe. 
The Dutch CDA is less conservative, probably because this party has to survive in a cultural 
context of individualisation and secularisation which is traditionally somewhat stronger in the 
Dutch context than elsewhere (among the OECD countries, the Netherlands ranked highest on 
the postmaterialism-scale in 1990, see Halman and Nevitte 1996: 248). The CDA is more alike 
the Kristlig Folkepartit, whereas the CDU/CSU is typically rightist-conservative. The spatial 
representation of parties in Figure 5 illuminates that the Dutch drift towards conservatism and 
rightist views is not as radical as elsewhere. 
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Where does this leave Pim Fortuyn internationally? With which parties should we compare 
his views? This was a hot issue during the Dutch election campaign that gave rise to many 
speculations by journalists who compared Fortuyn with Filip Dewinter, Jörg Haider and even 
with Le Pen. Fortuyn himself reacted fiercefully against these comparisons and rejected them 
as attempts to ʻdemonise  ʼhis person. He warned the established politicians that if something 
would happen to him (because of these accusations) they should be hold responsible.
 Figure 6 shows that LPF is not right-wing extremist if we use the FPÖ, the FI, FPS and 
the Fremkridtspartit as benchmarks. As expected, from all these parties, the Front National is 
evidently the most extremist one. It is striking that the Lega Nord and the Vlaams Blok are 
not taking right-wing extremist policy positions in their most recent manifestos5.  Both parties 
are regionalist parties that try to reach as many voters as possible. They differ from rightist-
conservative parties in that they are xenophobic, but at the same time strive against natives, i.e. 
Belgians who are not Flemish and Italians who do not live in the north.
 Although Fortuyn is positioned far away from Haider and Le Pen his views incorporate 
elements of the right-wing extremist discourse in a playful manner. This becomes apparent 
when we confront his views with the main themes of right-wing extremism: ethnic nationalism, 
anti-materialism, anti-parliamentarianism, and conspiracy theory (Fennema 1997). Fortuynʼs 
views are, strictly speaking, not based on ethnic nationalism but on civic nationalism since 
he accepts that fully integrated immigrants are as Dutch as natives are. Fortuyn appears 
materialistic (with his suits, ties, Jaguar and cigar) but his views are anti-materialist in that he 
defies the individualisation and fragmentation of society and the lack of social solidarity. His 
attitude towards the parliament is not hostile, but he is negative about most parliamentarians. 
The conspiracy theory is also implicitly part of his views in that he thinks that the Dutch nation 
is not as strong as it should be according to the ideology of ethnic superiority. It is further 
weakened by failing politicians who form a closed circuit in order to fulfil their own needs 
instead of those of the Dutch people. Fortuyn has toned down and reformulated a selection of 
elements of right-wing extremism in such a way that it appears to many as a just and challenging 
new way of looking at politics. In the 1980s, Janmaat propagated the issue of anti-immigration 
and the idea that the Netherlands is too crowded to let more people in. The established parties 
and the public opinion regarded his point of view as abject and disgusting. In 2002 it has 
become a central part of Fortuynʼs range of thought which, as a whole, is presented and also 
accepted as new and challenging by a large minority of the electorate.
 Anti-immigration was Fortuynʼs trick to attract the attention of the public. Bolkestein 
(VVD) tried to do this in previous elections but was less successful because he was an insider 
and member of the party cartel. Fortuyn was an entrepreneur who managed to transform his 
weak position as a complete outsider into his strongest asset: “it is me or them”. He said that 
the established parties are not capable to solve the problem of immigration because they do 
not recognise it since they have shut themselves completely of from what ordinary people 
experience on a daily basis. The earlier electoral success of Liveable Netherlands in local 
elections was based on the same populism and paved the way for Fortuyn.
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5. Conclusions and discussion
During the Dutch election of 2002 the established parties were challenged by new parties, of 
which the List Pim Fortuyn has been the most successful one, at least until the murder on its 
ʻlijsttrekkerʼ. The VVD entered the election campaign with the solemn belief that it would 
become the largest party. But within only 11 weeks time they fall from a shared first position 
with the PvdA (weeks 7 and 8) to a fourth position in week 18. In the same period a totally 
new party, resting solely on the campaign of one single person, was able to become the second 
largest party and also to become a potentially acceptable governing party after the elections. 
 The success of this party is to be explained mainly by the behaviour of the established 
parties themselves and not so much by that of the challenging parties. Fortuynʼs strong 
personality was an important short-term precondition for his success. But, compared with the 
other parties, Fortuynʼs programmatic ideas, proposals and solutions to problems were not very 
sophisticated. What was convincing, however, was his ability to attract popular attention and to 
expose the vulnerabilities of the current political elites in ways that made him look as the better 
alternative. The underlying long-term process which made this possible is convergence. 
 The potential danger of convergence is well known in the political science literature. 
When parties have an incentive to adopt increasingly “centrist” positions, there is a risk that 
they disappear in a “black hole” since radical parties displace them from the outer flanks of the 
political space (Rabinowitz, MacDonald and Listhaug 1991). The overall picture is that there 
has been convergence on the left-right dimension since 1977 so that the political centre has 
become crowded. The main reasons why this has happened are:
1. Established parties favour the office-seeking option and therefore want to 
increase  the chance to govern by taking a moderate policy chance.
2. The electoral defeat of the CDA in 1994 (losing 20 seats) has put a huge bonus on 
policy convergence because there were 20 empty seats to fill in the centre of the policy 
space which is pivotal in the Dutch system (allowing parties to take the median position)
However, one major effect is that the voters get disorientated when it becomes increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between political parties now that the two main left and right parties 
are united in one government. The left-right ideology provides the voters with a very effective 
instrument to judge where parties stand vis-à-vis their own preferences. When this instrument 
is swept away because party positions are becoming less distinguishable, then the motivation 
to vote for established parties becomes weaker. During the Purple cabinets this effect has 
become extra strong because the PvdA and the VVD have signed very detailed government 
declarations in order to prevent that these parties would frequently clash on policy issues 
(Thomson 1999; De Vries 1999). One consequence is that the debate among governing parties 
is seriously hampered by detailed agreements and this is also frustrating the opposition parties. 
This situation strengthens the impression among particular groups of voters that all parties are 
alike: governing parties and opposition parties are all representing a type of politician which 
is not very concerned with solving real-world problems in a way that matters for citizens. The 
Dutch National Election Studies show that this attitude is present among large parts of the 
electorate during all elections and it is seriously strengthened by the party behaviour described 
above (Thomassen et al. 2000). The governing parties have given priority to their short-term 
interest (catching votes from the CDA and to make sure that the Purple Cabinet will not 
collapse due to internal conflicts) and have neglected their long-term interest to maintain their 
credibility towards the voters. 
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 Convergence fundamentally affects the way the Dutch party system works. It increases 
the number of possible coalitions since the policy distance between parties has grown smaller. 
Competition becomes more intense because many votes can be won or lost due to incidents since 
voters are more easily prepared to switch between parties given the small distances between 
them. Cooperation becomes potentially more inclusive since the votes are getting scattered 
over more parties so that more parties are needed to form a government (in 2002 at least three 
parties are needed). Hence, the convergence has enlarged the possibilities for cooperation (in 
government) and competition (during the elections). At the same time these changes have made 
parties and party elites more vulnerable. Parties have become increasingly interchangeable in 
the way voters value them. The same goes for the elites in the way the party organisation treats 
them: two first candidates have been disposed of at the beginning of the campaign (namely of 
the CDA and of LN). During the campaign there were intense discussions on the capabilities 
of most leaders, also within the parties themselves. The initially strong leadership positions of 
Melkert (PvdA) and Dijkstal (VVD) were constantly debated during the campaign and both 
resigned directly after the elections because of their electoral defeat. 
 The successful rise of the newcomer LPF indicates that the neglect of the established 
parties to offer voters a real choice has ultimately undermined their own cartel position. The 
cartel party is likely to be replaced by an entrepreneurial party with a stronger role for non-
politicians as cabinet ministers, and for targets and performance instead of ideology. Fortuyn 
has proven that the entrepreneurial party can beat the cartel party in the Dutch system. This 
political fact gives the elections in 2002 the status of a landmark, not only in Dutch but also in 
European electoral history.
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Notes
1 Two days before the elections the PvdA suggested that Ad Melkert will not automatically become Prime 
Minister in case the PvdA would become the largest party. Melkert was informally withdrawn from the campaign 
and replaced by Wim Kok who appealed to the voters to vote sensible since their vote cannot be withdrawn and 
will affect policy-making in the upcoming four years. This was interpreted by many as a warning against an 
ʻemotional vote  ʼon the murdered Pim Fortuyn.
2 The success of local parties was expressed during the local elections of 6 March 2002 in which they won many 
seats at the cost of ʻnational  ʼparties (see below). These results show that the PvdA, VVD and D66 had already 
lost much of their electoral support 2 _ months before the elections. The opposition party CDA was the only 
established national party which won a significant number of local seats. The local elections proved that the 
established parties can be beaten. These victories made that Fortuynʼs incredible claim was not ignored by the 
media: “make no mistake, I will become Prime Minister!”.
Table 1. Aggregate Results of local Dutch elections, 6 March 2002
Party Seats (total) Plus/minus
Local 2188 +328
CDA 2152 +86
VVD 1504 -156
PvdA 1455 -231
Green Left 432 +34
Livable Netherlands 333 +251
CU 331 +26
D66 278 -54
SGP 241 +11
SP 143 -2
Others 23 -197
Source: http://www.trouw.nl/tr/fotos/raadsverkiezingen/Verkiezingen.gif (consulted 15 May 2002)
  
3 The NIPO-poll is based on a fixed group of 1200 respondents which has also been researched during the 
previous elections. Its competitor is the Interview/NSS-poll which is based on a group of respondents which 
changes every week. Interview/NSS predicted 19 seats for LPF in week 18, whereas NIPO predicted 26 seats. 
The low prediction for LPF by Interview/NSS is mainly due to the interviewing per telephone which make people 
reluctant to admit that they vote for Fortuyn (before his death). After his death this reluctance disappeared and the 
LPF won 5 seats in this poll. The error margin is 5% (7.5 seat per party). Source: NRC Handelsblad, 28 January 
2002, Volkskrant 15 May 2002..
 4 In case of LPF, the official summary of Fortuynʼs book ʻThe Ruins of the Purple Cabinets  ʼhas been used. It is 
accessible on URL: http://www.lijst-pimfortuyn.nl/party.php?goto=english (consulted 15 May 2002).
 5 In case of the Vlaams Blok the latest available data are from 1995. The previous programmes are estimated by 
Budge et al. (2001) as –2.33 on left-right and 7 on progressive-conservative. In 1995 the score on left-right=8.79 
and on progressive-conservative it is 10.9. In 1995 there was a strong emphasis on welfare state expansion (9.2% 
versus 6.1% in the previous programmes) and on environmental protection (9.9% versus 3.5% in the previous 
manifestos). On immigrants the VB is more radical than LPF (VB wants all non-European immigrants to return to 
their country), but this point of view is described in a few sentences in a document of more than 150 pages. The 
LPF-document is only 5 pages. These differences in size hinder the comparability. Furthermore, the viewpoints of 
Fortuyn were further nuanced during the election campaign (in April he wanted to legalise all illegal immigrants 
with a non-criminal background if a majority in parliament would agree to close to borders for most asylum 
seekers). In order to achieve a better comparison between LPF and VB a more detailed coding scheme and 
method would have to be devised (see Pennings and Keman 2002 for a discussion of a new methodology to 
estimate policy positions). 
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